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1. Introduction
Slurs are pejorative epithets that express negative attitudes toward a class of 
individuals sharing the same race (e.g., nigger, chink), country of  origin (dago, 
flip, wop), sexual orientation (faggot), religion (kike, fenian), health status 
(mongo, spaz), and other group-based identificatory properties. Although slurring 
 utterances usually target a specific individual, they derogate the whole category 
to which the individual belongs.
The peculiarity of slurs is that they do not only refer to some individuals, but 
simultaneously express a negative attitude or a negative feeling toward them. 
Although not all scholars agree on this point, it can be said that slurs  comprise 
a “dual” meaning: a referential meaning and a connotative1 meaning. The 
 referential component is the part of the meaning through which a slur refers to 
a class of persons. The connotative component is the part of the meaning that 
expresses the negative attitude of a speaker who uses the slur toward somebody. 
Let us compare the terms nigger and Afro-American. These expressions refer to 
the same class of individuals on the basis of a certain property: the extension of 
both nigger and Afro-American seems to be the set of dark-skinned people, while 
the intension appears to be made up of the properties of being a person and 
being dark-skinned. Nonetheless, these two terms differ substantially, as the first 
one denigrates dark-skinned people while the second one does not. Indeed, the 
connotative component of nigger conveys at code level the (negative) emotions, 
feelings, and assessments displayed by the speaker by means of that very term, 
whereas Afro-American is a “neutral” term.
Slurs, and pejoratives in general, can cause offense for many reasons (see Frigerio & 
Tenchini, 2019, pp. 152–154). The most obvious one is that they express the speaker’s 
negative attitude toward the addressee and consequently toward the whole class of 
persons to which the addressee belongs. Scholars using different approaches from va-
rious disciplines, but also “common” speakers in an intuitive way, agree in attributing 
to the utterer of a direct slur the responsibility for the derogatory act and its performa-
tive effects. Indeed, the use of slurs seems to signal an affiliation with racist practices 
1 Following Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977, 1980), I call this component of the meaning “connotative.” Other 
scholars use different labels, the most common of which is “expressive.”
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(on this point see, for instance, Nunberg, 2018 and Butler, 1997), which unfortuna-
tely are widespread, common, and reiterative. Thus, if a speaker says, “X is a nigger,” 
she is likely to be considered responsible for the offense,2 which cannot be canceled by 
simply adding “but I’m not a racist” or by using a similar tactic of disavowal.
The interpretation of the matter becomes more complicated when slurs are re-
ported. Indeed, it is unclear whether and to which degree reporting a slur can be 
offensive in the same way as in “direct,” non-reported uses. As a matter of fact, 
reporting a slur involves quoting not only the content but also the commitment 
and attitudes of the original speaker. Therefore, on the one hand, in reporting a 
slur the reporter may be seen as not expressing contempt toward the target for the 
fact that she is simply reporting what others have said; but, on the other hand, 
reporting a slur may also be interpreted as a form of association with the original 
speaker’s attitude.
Different theories about the derogatory component of the meaning of slurs pro-
vide different predictions about the preservation of their offensive potential in 
reporting contexts. This being the case, one means of verifying which theory is (or 
which theories are) more capable than others to explain the actual perception of 
the phenomenon consists of comparing theories with empirical data. To this end, 
the paper will present the data collected from a questionnaire.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 will briefly sketch out the main 
theoretical positions regarding the derogatory content of slurs. Section 3 will 
discuss the different predictions provided by the abovementioned theories about 
the preservation of slurs’ offensive potential in reporting contexts. Section 4 will 
present the results of a questionnaire aimed at verifying whether a slur maintains 
its offensive potential in reported speech and to what degree the addressee of 
a reported speech attributes to the speaker—be she the original speaker or the 
reporter, both of them, or neither—the responsibility for the slurring. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. The Main Theoretical Positions Regarding the Derogatory Content of Slurs
One of the most debated issues in Linguistics and Philosophy of Language con-
cerns the status of slurs’ derogatory content. Depending on the assumption that 
the derogatory content of slurs does or does not exist, different theories have been 
advanced regarding the status of such a connotative component of the meaning. 
2  Here, I do not account for and do not discuss the position of Butler when she claims that “[t]he racial slur is 
always cited from elsewhere, and in the speaking of it, one chimes in with a chorus of racists, producing at that 
moment the linguistic occasion for an imagined relation to an historically transmitted community of racists. 
In this sense, racist speech does not originate with the subject, even if it requires the subject for its efficacy, as it 
surely does. Indeed, racist speech could not act as racist speech if it were not a citation of itself” (Butler, 1997, 
p. 80, emphasis in the original).
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The literature is vast and often located at the intersection of different discipli-
nes. In this section, I simply review some of the studies that have contributed 
the most to characterize the research on this issue (for a survey, see Frigerio & 
Tenchini, 2014, Tenchini & Frigerio, 2016). Such theories can be divided into 
three large classes, the last of which can be further subdivided into several sub-
classes of its own.
The first approach is that of the scholars who claim that slurs do not have any 
derogatory content. It is a minority position whose main representatives are 
 Anderson and Lepore (Anderson & Lepore, 2013a, 2013b; Anderson, 2016). 
According to this deflationary position, slurs are taboo terms that cannot be 
used or mentioned in any context. Slurs “are prohibited words not on account 
of any content they get across, but rather because of relevant edicts surrounding 
their prohibition” (Anderson & Lepore, 2013a, p. 26). Consequently, their use 
is  always offensive, even in semantically vacuous sentences like “‘nigger’ means 
nigger” (Anderson & Lepore, 2013a, p. 38). Nunberg (2018) maintains a similar 
position. Adopting a social perspective, he holds that slurs have no derogatory 
content or meaning (Nunberg, 2018, p. 244) but are derogatory because they 
signal the speaker’s affiliation with a group that uses slurs with derogatory inten-
tions. He points out that “if slurs are marked, it’s because their use is a pointed 
conversational transgression—a departure from the norms that would ordinarily 
govern referential practice in that situation” (Nunberg, 2018, p. 264).
According to the second position, the derogatory content of slurs is part of their 
literal meaning – that is, of the truth conditions of the sentences containing them. 
This literalist approach is represented by Hom (2008, 2010, and 2012) and Hom 
and May (2013, 2018). Specifically, Hom and May maintain that the semantic 
content of a slur is identical to the conjunction of the neutral and the  derogatory 
content. For instance, nigger would mean the following: “Afro- American and 
 despicable because of it.” This approach incorporates the connotative component 
into the intension of the term. In addition, Hom and May (2013) argue that the 
extension of a term such as nigger is empty, as is that of any other slur (the thesis 
of “null extensionality” and “semantic innocence”), because no person is both 
Afro-American and despicable for being Afro-American.
According to the third position, which includes a variety of approaches, both 
pragmatic and semantic, the connotative content does exist but is not part of 
the truth-conditional meaning of slurs. The different approaches diverge on the 
nature of the connotative component. Some scholars—for example,  Schlenker 
(2007) and Cepollaro (2015)—identify the derogatory content of slurs with 
a kind of presupposition triggered by slurs. Provided that presuppositions are 
 defeasible—in the sense that it is possible, over the course of a conversation, 
to contradict the presupposition triggered by an item without rendering the 
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sentence infelicitous—this theory has difficulties in explaining why the contra-
diction of the derogatory content in “X is a nigger, but I have no prejudice toward 
black people” causes infelicity.
By contrast, a number of scholars claim that derogatory content is part of the 
semantic content. Some argue that it is a conventional implicature (CI) con-
veyed by the sentence containing a slur (Potts, 2005, 2007; Williamson, 2009; 
McCready, 2010; Whiting, 2013), serving “to indicate the speaker’s attitudes and 
commitments” (McCready, 2010, p. 50). Potts states the following: “Here [in 
expressives], more than anywhere else, the idea that CI items comment upon an 
asserted core, providing a means for a bit of editorializing on the part of speakers, 
seems apt” (Potts, 2005, p. 153).
Others claim that the derogatory content is either an expressive content compa-
rable to a gesture (Hornsby, 2001, p. 140) or a connotative component conveyed 
by the term simultaneously with the referential component in a double speech 
act, at the same time representative and expressive (Frigerio & Tenchini, 2014, 
Tenchini & Frigerio, 2016). The central idea of the double speech act account 
is that a speaker, in uttering a sentence containing a slur, performs two different 
speech acts: a representative act, by which the slur contributes with the same 
content as the corresponding neutral term, and an expressive act, by which the 
speaker expresses her attitude toward the extension of the slur.
Since Potts (2005), many scholars have observed that the derogatory component 
of slurs is preserved even when slurs are embedded in conditional, interrogative, 
and negative contexts, as in the following examples:
(1) Paul is a nigger.
(2) If Paul is a nigger, I do not want to deal with him.
(3) Is Paul a nigger?
(4) Paul is not a nigger.
So, sentences (2)–(4) denigrate Afro-Americans as much as (1) does. In light of 
this, one may ask whether also reporting/reported contexts preserve the offensive 
component of slurs. In fact, although the reporting context seems to be the most 
favorable to push the derogatory content into the scope of the reporting operator, 
this operation cannot be taken for granted.
3. Slurs in Reported Speech
When reporting a slur, the core questions concern the persistency of slurs’ dero-
gatory component in reported speech and the attribution of the responsibility for 
the slurring. Does the reporting speaker X in the following utterances derogate 
Afro-Americans by means of her act or not?
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(5) X: “Ann said, ‘Paul is a nigger’.”
(6) X: “Ann said that Paul is a nigger.”
On one hand, the answer may be that she does not: one might argue that the repor-
ter of (5) and (6) does not use but merely mentions the slur. If so, the speaker does 
not express any contempt toward Afro-Americans but simply attributes the dero-
gation to Ann (this is, at least, one of the possible interpretations). Consequently, 
(5)–(6) would not have any offensive potential in the ongoing reporting context.
Nonetheless, if the use of the derogatory expression in direct reported speech as 
(5) may seem to be quite undoubtedly Ann’s responsibility (and prosody may 
help to disambiguate), it is not so clear whether the slur’s use must be attributed 
to Ann in (6). Ann might have stated, “Paul is an Afro-American,” and the repor-
ter might have reported Ann’s words as in (6) because she herself hates people of 
color. So, in the case of indirect reported speech, the attribution of the derogatory 
attitude is unclear.
But even in uttering (5), the reporter is not completely free of responsibility. 
She could have chosen a neutral term instead of the slur when reporting Ann’s 
words. She could have specified, commented, or glossed that it was Ann who had 
used an offensive term in referring to Afro-Americans. She could have used other 
precautions—for example, the “N-word” euphemism, the gesture of quotations 
marks, or particular prosodic contours.
Hence, in both (5) and (6) one might believe that the reporter adheres to Ann’s 
opinions, at least to a certain degree.
How can we explain such double interpretation? It depends to a large extent on 
the nature of reported speech.3 Using reported speech, the speaker usually shares 
information with somebody about what someone else has said (in this paper, we 
assume that somebody has effectively said something at a previous time).
The basic condition of all forms of reported speech is a displacement of the utte-
rance plans that should be perceived by the hearers/addressees. This is reflected in 
the sometimes different, sometimes coincident, but nonetheless distinct voices, 
narrative perspectives, and consequent (re)organization of the deictic centers, 
evaluative perspectives, illocutionary forces, and perlocutionary effects. “Multi-
voicedness” and “double-voicedness” are the notions used by Bakhtin (1963/1984) 
to explain the persistence of the words of others in any utterances: “Someone 
else’s words introduced into our own speech inevitably assume a new (our own) 
3 The literature on reported speech is vast and interdisciplinary. In this paper, I only mention the few contri-
butions that are relevant to our topic. For a recent review of the scholarship on reported speech, see Brendel, 
Meibauer, and Steinbach (2011); Arendholz, Bublitz, and Kirner-Ludwig (2015); Capone (2016); Capone, 
Kiefer, and Lo Piparo (2016); Capone, García-Carpintero, and Falzone (2019).
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i nterpretation and become subject to our evaluation of them; that is, they become 
double-voiced. All that can vary is the interrelationship between these two voices” 
(Bakhtin, 1984, p. 195). Alessandro Capone describes indirect reports as “seg-
ments of speech involving a dialogic dimension” (Capone, 2019, p. 3). The issue 
of “report” is thoroughly summed up by Keith Allan as follows:
X’s report is never exactly identical with Z’s utterance; even if the same 
words are captured, the context is different, the voice will be different, the 
speaker’s intentions may be different, the medium may be different. Often 
X will choose to render the report more coherent by rearranging what 
was said, and/or more vivid by embellishing the original to attract and/or 
maintain audience attention. When X’s report ρ is compared with Z’s utte-
rance u, the accuracy of ρ depends on whether or not Z’s message in u can 
be reconstructed from it. In other words, the content of ρ is dependent on 
the content of u. An accurate report ρ re-presents the illocutionary point 
of the source utterance u. (Allan, 2016, p. 211–212)
“Never exactly identical … even if the same words are captured” means that every 
kind of report displays a sort of indirectness or obliquitas (see Tenchini, 2003). 
“An accurate report ρ re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance 
u” implies that reporting a slur may constitute a problem because of the connota-
tive component of its meaning. In reporting a slurring utterance, one reports its 
illocutionary force and maybe its perlocutionary effects. Therefore, here the main 
problem is, on the side of the reporter, how to keep the voices distinct, and, on 
the side of the addressee, how to perceive this distinction. Defining “footing” as 
the alignment of an individual to a particular utterance or projected self,  Goffman 
(1981, p. 128) observes a case of constant “shift footing” in reported speech:
When a speaker employs conventional brackets to warn us that what he is 
saying is meant to be taken in jest, or as mere repeating of words by some-
one else, then it is clear that he means to stand in a relation of reduced per-
sonal responsibility for what he is saying. He splits himself off from the content 
of the words by expressing that their speaker is not he himself or not he himself 
in a serious way. (Goffman, 1974, p. 512, emphasis mine)
As a matter of fact, there are several strategies that can perform the task of 
 marking alterity: syntactic, lexical, prosodic, vocal (voice quality), gestural, or 
narrative-stylistic. But when a slur is reported, shifting footing and distinguishing 
the voices becomes a particularly complex operation because the connotative 
component of the slur conveys an attitude that has moral implications on the 
side of the  reporter. Is there way to prevent the reporter from having to bear 
the responsibility for somebody else’s speech? 
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3.1 The main theoretical positions about slurs in reported speech
The different theories presented in Section 2 make different predictions about the 
offensiveness of slurs in reported speech.
Anderson and Lepore’s silentist position is quite “extreme,” and the answer within 
their theoretical framework is categorical: any use or mention of a slur in any 
context has the potential to offend, and thus the violation of the prohibition also 
concerns the reporting of slurs uttered by other speakers. In the sentence
(6) Ann said that Paul is a nigger
the offensiveness should be doubtlessly ascribed to the reporter and not to Ann 
“as part of what she said” (Anderson & Lepore, 2013a, p. 35) because the  reporter 
has violated the prohibition on uttering a taboo-word, such as a slur. Therefore, 
this theory predicts that (5)–(6) denigrate Afro-Americans as much as (1)–(4).
The literalist position, as we have seen, maintains that the semantic content of 
a slur is identical to the conjunction of the neutral and derogatory content and 
that both contents are part of the truth conditions of the sentence in which 
the slur occurs. So, nigger would mean “Afro-American and despicable because 
of it (for being Afro-American).” This position creates some problems when it 
has to explain why the pejorative content necessarily takes wide scope in some 
contexts (modal, temporal, conditional, and report). Indeed, according to Hom 
the derogatory content of slurs is displaceable or “narrow-scoping” (Hom, 2008, 
p. 424–426; 2012, p. 387). “Displaceable” or “narrow scoping” means that the 
truth-conditional contents remain confined within the scope of any operator. 
In other words, they do not scope out of the domain of any negative, con-
ditional, interrogative, and report operator. This condition is fundamental for 
explaining the attribution of responsibility4 for the slurring. Thus, this theory 
predicts that slurs are not offensive when reported because when X says that Ann 
said that Paul is a nigger, X is saying that Ann said that Paul is Afro-American 
and despicable because of it. In such a case, it is Ann and not X who is always 
responsible for the act of slurring because conjunctions do not scope out. The 
fact that the meaning of a slur is literal (i.e., the denotative and the derogative 
content are conjoined) prevents the reporting speaker from being charged with 
the derogation.
The theories of the third group mentioned in Section 2 agree in treating the 
derogatory content of slurs as an independent component of the meaning. 
 Nonetheless, they approach the question of the attribution of offensiveness and 
responsibility in an act of slurring differently.
4 On the non-displaceability of evaluative commitments, see the analysis of different possible scenarios presen-
ted in Taylor (2019, pp. 69–72).
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According to Schlenker’s and Cepollaro’s presuppositional approach, besides 
providing the same contribution to the truth conditions of the sentence as the 
neutral term, a slur triggers a presupposition that conveys the derogatory content 
toward the target group. Consider the following sentence:
(1) Paul is a nigger.
The utterer of (1) states that Paul is Afro-American and presupposes that 
 Afro-Americans are despicable for being such. One of the (main) features of 
presuppositions is that they project outside of the conditional, question, and nega-
tion scopes, and this explains why (2)–(4) denigrate Afro-Americans as much as (1) 
does. Instead, (5)–(6) should not express any offensive content by the  reporter be-
cause the standard theory of presuppositions claims that verba  dicendi are “plugs.”5 
Accordingly, slurring expressions do not scope out in  reporting  contexts. In order 
to solve this aporia, Schlenker, among others, tries to amend this  prediction by 
resorting to the so-called condition of “perspective dependence.” He glosses this 
condition as follows: “expressive content is evaluated from a particular perspective. 
In general, the perspective is the speaker’s, but there can be deviation if conditions 
are right” (Schlenker, 2007, p. 239, emphasis mine). On this basis, he maintains 
that the presuppositions activated by slurs are “sometimes shiftable,” which means 
that “the context of evaluation need not be the  context of the actual utterance” 
(Schlenker, 2007, p. 237, author’s emphasis). Thus, Schlenker seems to suggest 
that the original speaker is not always responsible for the slur’s derogatory content 
although verba dicenda are plugs: the responsibility  depends on the context of the 
utterance.
“Perspective dependence” plays a key role also for those theories that consider the 
derogatory content of slurs as a CI. When an expressive is used, “it is tempting to 
assume that the perspective encoded in the expressive aspects of an utterance is al-
ways the speaker’s” (Potts, 2007, p. 173, emphasis mine). The feelings and attitudes 
expressed are usually to be ascribed to the speaker within the ongoing utterance 
situation rather than at a different time or place. Therefore, when the slur is em-
bedded in some kind of reporting context, the responsibility of the slurring should 
be ascribed to the reporting speaker. Nonetheless, this reading does not exclude 
the opposite case, namely that the responsibility may sometimes be attributed to 
the original speaker. Indeed, Potts claims that the perspective need not coincide 
with that of the reporter (Pott, 2007, p. 175–176), although this “non-speaker-
oriented reading” must be supported by “a special intonation contour” or, in print, 
by quotation marks (Potts, 2005, p. 160). He concludes that “it is worth stressing 
5 Plugs are “predicates which block off all the presuppositions of the complement sentence [examples include 
‘say’, ‘mention’, ‘tell, ask’]” (see Karttunen, 1973, p. 178).
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that, though quotative utterances can give rise to what appear to be embedded 
readings, a general analysis should treat them as scopeless” (Potts, 2005, p. 160).
The predictions of the double speech act account (Frigerio & Tenchini, 2014, 
Tenchini & Frigerio, 2016) are similar to those of Potts: in reported speech, 
the derogatory content should be attributed prima facie to the reporter because 
she uses the slur and then performs the double act, the expressive act included. 
Nonetheless, this theory acknowledges shifting cases, especially when the con-
texts of the utterance and the deictic centers are clearly distinct. This depends 
on the features of reported speech whose peculiarity, as stated above, consists 
in the displacement of the utterance plans. The shifting of the responsibility 
for connotative expressions from the reporting context to the reported one can 
therefore be considered a live possibility. Indeed, different contextual cues and 
clues can favor one of the two possible readings. But even though the narrow-
scope reading of the derogatory content is possible, in many cases the speaker 
who reports a sentence containing a slur avoids quoting it so that its derogatory 
content cannot be ascribed to her if she does not feel any negative attitude to-
ward the target group.
This short excursus should have shown the difficulties inherent in attributing re-
sponsibility for an act of slurring. The possible predictions can be summed up as 
follows: prohibitionsits claim that every report of a slur is offensive and that the 
reporter is responsible for the derogatory content and the subsequent offensive-
ness. Conversely, the literalists claim that offensiveness is to be attributed to the 
original speaker. The other scholars we have considered (the pragmatists and the 
expressivists) are more flexible in attributing the responsibility for the slurring. It 
can be attributed either to the original speaker (in this case the reported speech is 
not derogatory) or to the reporter (and in this case the reported speech is slurring). 
This being the case, to verify which theory is (or which theories are) more apt to ex-
plain the actual perception of the phenomenon on the part of the addressee of the 
reported speech, it seems to be necessary to compare theories with empirical data.
4. Empirical Verification
In this section, I briefly survey the results of an anonymized online questionnaire 
that was prepared by a student during the writing of her undergraduate thesis 
(“Gli slurs nel discorso riportato”, academic year 2017–18, unpublished) 
 under my supervision (for details about composition, participants, materi-
als, and  procedures, see Tenchini & Frigerio, 2020, Section 6).6 The study’s 
 participants comprised 121 Italian undergraduate students who were tested 
6 For previous studies empirically testing the offensiveness of slurs and other pejoratives in reported speech, cf. 
Panzeri and Carrus (2016), Cepollaro, Sulpizio, and Bianchi (2019).
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about their perception of the degree of offensiveness of pejoratives in gene-
ral and slurs in particular in different utterance contexts. The different input 
utterances were intentionally presented without any description of the para-
verbal component,7 as the questionnaire was intended to test the offensiveness 
conveyed by the very term per se in relation to the speaker. Here, I extrapolate 
only the data referring to slurs and not other pejoratives. The questionnaire 
was designed in Italian; the slur under consideration was frocio (an Italian slur 
designating homosexuals, similar to “faggot”). The questionnaire was divided 
into five sections, with each section consisting of five questions containing 
some recurring terms. For the purposes of this study, it is enough to review 
the following three cases:
Situation (a) (which serves as the basis for comparison): attribution of the term 
to a third person with the indication of the name of the speakers (Y: “X is t”). 
The participants were asked to evaluate the offensiveness of Y toward X in:
(7) Ann: “Paul is a faggot” (Y: “X is t”).
Five different answers were possible: yes, very much; yes; moderately; not 
much; not.
Situation (b): indirect reported speech (Z: “Y has said that X is t”). The partici-
pants were asked to evaluate the offensiveness of the reporter Z toward X in:
(8) John: “Ann has said that Paul is a faggot” (Z: “Y has said that X is t”).
The same five different answers were possible: yes, very much; yes; moderately; 
not much; not.
Situation (c): indirect reported speech (Z: “Y has said that X is t”). The par-
ticipants were asked to evaluate which of the speakers they perceived as more 
 offensive, the reporter or the original speaker, in the same context:
(8) John: “Ann has said that Paul is a faggot” (Z: “Y has said that X is t”).
In this case four different answers were possible: Y is more offensive; Z is more 
offensive; neither of them is offensive; and both are offensive.
Tables 1–3 present the results of the questionnaire (percentages are rounded up 
to the nearest unit):
Situation (a) Y: “X is t.”
Situation (b) Z: “Y has said that X is t.”
Situation (c) Z: “Y has said that X is t.”
7 On the role of phonetics in the disambiguation of the performativity, see for example Bonacchi and 
Andreeva, 2017.
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4.1 Discussion
The results of the questionnaire point out that the data do not support one theory 
over the others. These results are the perfect reflection of the difficulties inherent 
in the interpretation of a reported slur.
The data are problematic for the silentist theory. Indeed, this approach claims 
that the mere mention of slurs is offensive, regardless of whether these terms are 
directly attributed or reported. However, the percentage of perceived offensive-
ness drops significantly when the slur is embedded in a reporting context: 33% 
(Table 2) instead of 84% of the participants (Table 1) consider the slur to be 
offensive or very offensive. Moreover, the percentage of the participants who do 
not consider the slur to be offensive increases from 1% to 33% (Table 2).
The data are problematic for the literalist theory too. According to this theory, 
slurs embedded in reported speech are attributed to the reported speaker, but 
34% of the participants also consider the reporter as offensive or very offensive, 
and 21% as moderately offensive (Table 2). With regard to the data collected in 
Table 3, this theory does not account for the 29% of the participants who consi-
der both speakers offensive and the 4% who considers the reporter more offensive.
The theories of the third group are more “flexible” and hence more apt to account 
for the data. Indeed, although based on different assumptions, they all account for 
the possibility of shifting, which can explain why one-third of the participants jud-
ged the slur embedded in reported speech as very offensive or offensive, one-third 
as moderately and not very offensive, and one-third as non-offensive (Table 2). 
Concerning the attribution of responsibility (Table 3), these flexible theories could 
explain why the vast majority of the participants (66%) attributed the offensiven-
ess to the original speaker, and also why 29% believes that the reporter shares the 
responsibility with the original speaker.
Table 2. Is Z offensive toward X?
Yes, very much Yes Moderately Not much No
11% 23% 21% 12% 33%
Table 3. Who is more offensive towards X? Y or Z?
Y is more offensive Z is more offensive Neither is offensive Both are offensive
66% 4% 1% 29%
Table 1. Is Y offensive toward X?
Yes, very much Yes Moderately Not much No
46% 38% 12% 3% 1%
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5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine the offensiveness of slurs in reported 
speech. After having presented the main theories about the semantic status of 
these expressions and the persistency of their offensiveness in reported speech, 
their predictions have been assessed by means of a questionnaire aimed at regis-
tering the intuitive judgments of the addressees of a reported speech about the 
degree and attribution of offensiveness. This paper used only a part of the entire 
data gathered by the questionnaire, specifically the data on slurs. As the data have 
shown, the participants’ judgments were not uniform, and the findings suggest 
that only the theories defined as “flexible” seem to be equipped to explain the 
variety of participants’ reactions. On the contrary, the silentist and the literalist 
approaches do not account for addressees’ judgments because they predict that 
the derogatory content should be entirely attributed to either the reporter or the 
original speaker, excluding shifting cases. This would seem to demonstrate that, 
in the absence of evident strategies of mitigation or distancing by the reporter, 
the interpretation of the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of a re-
ported slur/act of slurring depends to a large extent on the addressees’ sensitivity 
and attitude. Consequently, no single theory can provide a conclusive statement 
on this matter.
The results presented here concern only Italian subjects and Italian language. 
It would be worth involving in future investigations people belonging to other 
 cultures and other languages to ascertain whether and to what degree these  results 
could be confirmed. Indeed, the nature of verbal aggression acts and the percep-
tion the offensiveness of certain actions is—at least partly—culturally  dependent, 
as Bonacchi’s culturological approach effectively highlights (see for instance 
 Bonacchi, 2012, 2013).
Summary
Slurs are pejorative epithets that express negative attitudes toward a class of individuals 
sharing the same race, country of origin, sexual orientation, religion, and the like. The 
aim of this paper is to show what happens in communication when slurs are reported. 
It focuses on the derogatory content of such expressions and on the persistence of their 
performative effects in reported speech. In this respect, the question concerning the at-
tribution of responsibility for the derogatory content conveyed by the slurs is relevant. 
Indeed, reporting a slur involves quoting not only the content but also the speaker’s 
personal commitment and (negative) attitude. Different theories on the status of the 
derogatory component of slurs make different predictions about their offensiveness in 
reported speech and about the speaker’s “responsibility” for the attitude and feelings 
conveyed by that word, be she the original speaker or the reporter. The results of a ques-
tionnaire show empirically that no single theory can provide a conclusive statement on 
this matter.
Keywords: slurring, reported speech, performative effects, responsibility attribution.
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Zusammenfassung
Slurs sind abwertende Bezeichnungen, die eine negative Einstellung gegenüber den 
 Eigenschaften ausdrücken, die den betreffenden Personen oder Gruppen auf der 
Basis der Rasse, der Herkunft, der Religionszugehörigkeit usw. zugeschrieben werden. 
 Dieser Beitrag zielt darauf ab, zu zeigen, was in der Kommunikation passiert, wenn slurs 
 wiedergegeben werden. Im Fokus stehen der abwertende Bestandteil der  Bedeutung solcher 
Ausdrücke und die Wirkungsdauer ihrer performativen Effekte in der  Redewiedergabe. 
In dieser Hinsicht wird auch die Frage der Zuschreibung von Verantwortung bezüglich 
der abwertenden Bedeutung, die das verunglimpfende Wort vermittelt,  relevant. 
 Verschiedene Theorien über den Status des abwertenden Bestandteils der slurs treffen 
unterschiedliche Vorhersagen über deren Offensivität in der Redewiedergabe und über 
die Verantwortung des Sprechers (sei er/sie der originale oder der wiedergebende) für 
die durch den  Ausdruck vermittelte negative Einstellung. Anhand einer empirischen 
 Umfrage wird gezeigt, dass keine Theorie eine eindeutige Erklärung dafür liefern kann.
Schlüsselwörter: abwertende Ausdrücke, Redewiedergabe, performative Effekte, 
Verantwortungszuschreibung.
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